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Mahé and the Politics of Empire:
Trade, Conquest, and Revolution on
the Malabar Coast
Gregory T. Mole
“Everyone in Paris, Lorient, and even
Pondicherry told me that that little comptoir was
nothing; that one would never achieve anything
there1.”
1 Such  were  the  warnings  conveyed  to  Pierre-Antoine  Duprat  in  1772.  Freshly
commissioned as  a  colonel  in the French army,  Duprat  had received an unenviable
assignment: he was to serve as governor of Mahé, a small French trading post – or
comptoir – on the southwestern (Malabar) coast of India. Mahé was remote, poor, and
vulnerable;  a  forgotten  outpost  in  a  forgotten  corner  of  France’s  colonial  empire.
Administered first  by the Compagnie des  Indes (the French East India Company),  and
then directly by the crown after the Company’s  dissolution in 1769,  the settlement
often  proved  out  of  sync  with  France’s  other  factory-towns  in  India.  The  town
remained neutral, for example, when France and Britain formally declared war during
the 1740s, dividing shares of the local pepper trade with its British rivals while conflict
raged  across  the  other  comptoirs2.  Isolation  bred  peculation  and  unrest.  Reports  of
corruption within Mahé abounded, while contentious political conditions in the region
surrounding the town limited its opportunities for growth. During his journey to India,
Duprat heard the same opinion in every port: even the ablest administrator could not
rescue the comptoir from its enduring state of mediocrity.
2 These claims resonate within the historiography of France’s colonial empire, which has
consistently consigned Mahé to the margins. The very conditions that seemed to have
limited  Mahé’s  development,  however,  offer  valuable  insight  into  the  dynamics  of
power operating within France’s  Indian settlements  in  the final  decades of  the Old
Regime.  This  article  analyzes  the  history  of  the  comptoir over  the  course  of  the
eighteenth century, ranging from Mahé’s establishment in 1725 to its capture by the
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British during the French Revolution.  The story of  France’s  colonial  activity on the
subcontinent tends to be broken into distinct phases; scholars analyze the Company’s
changing commercial policies, French military operations in India, and the evolution of
French revolutionary politics in the comptoirs as discrete historical developments3. Yet
as I illustrate, Mahé exhibited remarkable continuity over the course of the eighteenth
century – confounding these historiographical divisions. In the face of a shifting array
of external pressures, the town’s notables fixated on the same set of local concerns: the
settlement’s geographical vulnerability, isolation, and chronic lack of funding. Over the
span of several decades and several different administrative regimes, they capitalized
continually on developments outside the comptoir to address these recurring problems.
When viewed from the perspective of an individual comptoir, France’s colonial project
looks less a cohesive enterprise undergirded by crown sovereignty than a fractured
endeavor  riddled  with  competing  nodes  of  authority  and  instantiations  of  power.
Mahé’s  history,  in short,  reminds us that even supposedly marginal  colonial  spaces
imposed their own rhythms on the reigning ideologies of  empire in the eighteenth
century.
3 India’s significance to France often went beyond immediate material and geo-political
considerations. As Kate Marsh writes, the land became a “locus… for assessing French
national interests” – looming large in the imagination of France’s political economists,
philosophes,  military leaders,  and crown ministers4.  From the time of the Company’s
inception in 1664 by Louis XIV’s famed finance minister, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, French
maintained lofty expectations for its Indian colonies. The establishment of a vibrant
Indian trade would facilitate the development of France’s domestic economy, frustrate
the designs of rival English and Dutch corporations, and extend royal authority beyond
the  Cape  of  Good  Hope.  Even  after  the  company’s  dissolution,  India  continued  to
capture the attention of policy makers,  who hoped to make the recovery of French
territory on the subcontinent the centerpiece of France’s colonial strategy after the
Seven Years’ War. 
4 This  article  uses  three  case  studies  –  each situated within  a  discrete  period in  the
historiography  of  French  India  –  to  rethink  Mahé’s  place  within  the  political
imagination  of  the  Old  Regime.  As  it  shows,  the  expectations  of  metropolitan
policymakers were not simply imposed on the Indian factory-towns by crown ministers
and Company directors in France. Over time, the comptoirs developed their own trading
networks, territorial ambitions, and cultural identity. Susan Dawdy investigates such a
process in her study of colonial New Orleans, using the concept of “rogue colonialism”
to describe the flexible commercial and political strategies the city developed in its
relative isolation from metropolitan regulation5. This model provides a useful reminder
of the forces driving municipal developments in sites across France’s colonial empire.
As Mahé’s case reveals, isolation not only facilitated the creation of new markets and
identities, but also the growth of a self-serving political economy and political culture.
The comptoir’s  inhabitants approached everything from the commercial mandates of
the  Company  to  the  energies  released  by  the  Revolution  according  to  their  own
internal logic – interpreting these developments to suit the immediate needs of the
comptoir. For them, the logic of France’s colonial enterprise was shaped according to
fundamentally local concerns. 
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Private Trade and Public Interest
5 Mahé lies on the southwestern coast of India, covering both banks of a winding river
(the Mahé) before it spills out into the Arabian Sea. Coconut palms blanket the town,
which is dominated by a range of hills radiating out from the coast6.  Contemporary
accounts lauded the settlement’s beauty, salubrious climate, and commercial prospects.
Simon  de  la  Farelle,  a  French  officer  who  served  in  the  campaign  to  seize  Mahé,
described the town’s weather as the “healthiest and most temperate in India7.” He also
noted  the  abundance  of  grapes,  cardamom,  betel,  and  pepper  that  grew along  the
Malabar Coast. In both agricultural and aesthetic terms, Mahé seemed ideally located.
While the hills surrounding the town offered stunning vistas, its fertile coastal plains
supplied a wealth of valuable trading commodities. 
6 If the town’s topography created an appealing panorama, however, it also generated a
daunting set of challenges. A sand bar blocked the mouth of the Mahé River, hindering
the construction of harbor facilities, and a particularly severe monsoon season closed
the  settlement’s  port  for  months.  The  hills  surrounding  Mahé  left  it  vulnerable  to
attack,  requiring heavy outlays  for  defense.  With a  garrison of  120 French soldiers,
150 sepoys,  and  30 cannon,  the  comptoir’s  military  expenditures  rivaled  that  of  the
much larger French settlement at Pondichéry8. Aggressive enemies lurked all around:
both the English at the nearby settlement of Tellicherry and regional potentates along
the Malabar Coast frequently challenged French interests in the area.  Even with its
outsized military budget, Mahé remained precariously placed. The French maintained a
small subordinate factory within the nearby kingdom of Calicut – a trading station that
rarely held more than a single employee9. Otherwise, Mahé was isolated from the other
French  outposts  in  India.  These  geographical,  logistical,  and  political  impediments
stunted the growth of the settlement; excepting a few periods of temporary expansion,
Mahé rarely exceeded 200 hectacres (roughly two square kilometers) in area10. 
7 The settlement was ruled jointly by a governor and a three-man assembly known as the
conseil  provincial,  which  was  responsible  for  the  town’s  administration,  commerce,
police, and court system11. Company merchants staffed the council positions, and were
appointed to office by the existing councilors. In theory, this arrangement reinforced
the hierarchical  model  of  Company rule:  while  responsible  for  local  affairs,  Mahé’s
councilors were subordinate to the larger conseil supérieur in Pondichéry, as well as the
overarching authority of the corporate directorate in Paris. The councils,  moreover,
contained  a  clear  chain  of  command  –  with  the  rank  of  each  councilor  based  on
seniority. The town’s employees were similarly regimented, divided broadly between
commercial  and  military  professions12.  In  practice,  however,  this  political  system
cohered little with such a rigid conception of colonial authority. The council’s small
size,  for  instance,  militated  against  the  creation  of  a clear  ranking  system.  Mahé
collaborated with, more than deferred to, its neighboring colonial councils; its leaders
exercised  authority  through  informal  networks  of  power  built  on  patronage  and
kinship, and adopted a flexible strategy of negotiation and coalition building with local
European and  indigenous  powers.  As  with  many colonial  governments  in  Asia,  the
settlement’s council was amphibious in nature, varying between modes of obedience
and  open  defiance  to  superior  authorities,  and  alternatively  defining  itself  as  a
merchant body and as an autonomous political entity13.
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8 Consider the way town officials addressed problems of local governance through the
broader commercial ideology of the Company. Due to its size and location, Mahé was
subject to a constant strain, torn between alluring prospects for trade and the material
realities  that  constrained  them.  When the  French  established  the  comptoir  in  1721,
pepper was in high demand both in Europe and along regional trading circuits in the
India Ocean. Indeed, the price of this commodity rose by 50% between 1722 and 173914.
The Company required Mahé’s employees to meet an annual quota for pepper, as well
as other regional commodities. Yet the settlement’s heavy infrastructure costs depleted
the funds set aside by the Company for these purchases. As one specialist notes, “it was
money, always money” that proved the limiting factor in Mahé’s commercial growth15.
The constant lack of funding forced town administrators to rely on independent French
traders  operating  along  the  Malabar  Coast  to  develop  Company  commerce  in  the
region.  These  merchants  bought  surplus  pepper  from  the  cash-strapped  Company
merchants  to  sell  within local  markets.  Necessity  thus created the conditions  for  a
thriving private trade—one in which Company employees, who faced a shifting set of
prohibitions against independent commercial activity, often engaged. 
9 There was a constant demand for pepper in the markets surrounding Mahé. French
merchants called on ports in the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf, as well as along India’s
eastern (Coromandel) coast, and supplemented their local stocks by importing pepper
from China16.  This “country” trade, so-called because it  concentrated on markets in
India and the Indian Ocean rather than on the export of goods to France, often yielded
excellent returns, helping to offset the comptoir’s chronic lack of specie. Yearly funds
sent from France to Mahé often arrived late – or sometimes not at all. The large profits
generated by the “country” trade, by contrast, could be used immediately to purchase
more pepper. Policymakers in Paris weighed the benefits of this commercial activity
with the various challenges it created – struggling, in the process, to adopt a consistent
position. After all, the demands of these local trading networks were almost always in
tension with the Company’s broader commercial agenda. “Country” trade facilitated
the  development  of  Mahé’s  pepper  industry,  but  it  also  diverted  commodities
earmarked for France to more lucrative regional markets.
10 The  development  of  private  trade  along  the  Malabar  Coast  thus  spurred  conflict
between administrators in Paris and Pondichéry and employees in Mahé. Take the 1739
Mahé  pepper  scandal,  a  contentious  affair  whose  origins  lay  in  the  fraught
circumstances behind the comptoir’s establishment. In 1721, Company representatives
in  Calicut  signed  an  agreement  with  the  Bayanour  of  Bargaret,  ruler  of  the  small
princely state of Kadattanad, permitting them to settle at Mahé. The machinations of
Robert Adam, the British governor of Tellicherry, however, delayed Company attempts
to settle in the region. Eager to prevent French encroachment on the Malabar pepper
trade, Adam incited a conflict in Kadattanad, attacked Company outposts around Mahé,
and  pushed  the  Bayanour  to  abrogate  his  agreement.  A  French  squadron  led  by
Bertrand-François Mahé de la Bourdonnais, who was to become one of the Company’s
most famous employees, eventually relieved the settlement with a force of 250 soldiers
and 100 sailors in 172517.  The damage to the town, though, had been done. Military
action secured the Company’s claim to Mahé, and earned La Bourdonnais a celebrated
nickname (the “Mahé” in his title). But the years of conflict frustrated French trading
efforts  in  the  region,  and  saddled  the  settlement  with  a  considerable  debt.  Nearly
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insolvent,  town  officials  commissioned  private  merchants  to  buy  pepper  on  the
Company’s behalf. Thus began the comptoir’s dependence on private trade. 
11 By the 1730s, Mahé finally had enough money to purchase pepper on its own. Yet the
town’s addiction to private capital did not abate. Now, instead of buying pepper from
private traders, Company officials began to sell surplus quantities to these merchants
at an 8% surcharge, investing the profits in the town’s infrastructure. Private societies
such  as  Bonaventure  Louet’s  Société  de  Mahé flourished  throughout  the  decade,
exploiting the high local  demand for  pepper –  and their  easy access  to  discounted
sources of the commodity – to expand their role in the “country” trade. Even with its
mark-up, the Company’s prices for these middlemen were roughly 15% cheaper than
those  of  the  open market18.  Private  traders  thus  eagerly  purchased  Mahé’s  surplus
quantities of pepper.
12 Initially, this arrangement seemed to meet the needs of all the parties involved. The
Company received regular infusions of specie, while private merchants gained cheap
and easy access to the region’s pepper19. Such a compromise, however, would prove
untenable  in  the  long  run.  The  division  between  private  and  Company  commerce,
unclear in the best of circumstances, became particularly muddled in Mahé as many of
its  councilors  and employees  began investing  in  societies  such as  Louet’s.  As  more
members  of  the  Company  became  involved  in  private  trade,  the  comptoir stopped
meeting  its  pepper  quotas  –  all  this  despite  the  fact  that  independent  merchants
operating out  of  Mahé continued sending private expeditions to Mocha,  Basra,  and
China during the same period20.
13 Over time, the conseil supérieur in Pondichéry grew suspicious of the commitment of the
comptoir’s  employees  to  the  Company’s  trading  interests,  blaming  “the  poor
administration  of  [Mahé’s]  council”  for  the  years  of  diminishing  pepper  returns21.
Tensions  came to  a  head  in  April  1739,  when  several  key  figures  in  the  comptoir’s
administration  –  Bunel,  who  served  as  a  councilor,  as  well  as  Louet  and  another
employee, Saint-Martin – replaced a ship transporting private freight to the port of
Mocha,  L’Heureux,  with  a  Company  vessel,  La  Marie  Joseph, which  was  carrying
“equipment” to the French outpost at Pegu in Persia. While initially perplexed over
why Bunel and his accomplices had switched the ships,  the conseil  supérieur quickly
guessed the reason: whereas La Marie Joseph was in “good condition” and “well crewed,”
L’Heureux was  “leaky,”  and its  sailors  “completely  exhausted” after  a  fifteen-month
voyage22. Bunel and his associates ensured the safety of their goods by placing them in
the  most  seaworthy  vessel  available  in  Mahé.  They  had  openly  neglected  their
obligations to the Company in favor of private enterprise, seemingly confirming the
conseil  superieur’s  fear that  officials  in  Mahé  had  been  reselling  Company  pepper
through the city’s private societies.
14 The councilors in Pondichéry responded to these transgressions by dismissing all three
members of Mahé’s administrative council and placing Bunel, Louet, and Saint-Martin
under house arrest  in mid-April.  Not  all  of  the councilors,  however,  accepted their
punishment  gracefully.  Bunel  fled  his  home  on  the  night  of  the  sixteenth  or
seventeenth, “leaving no trace by sea or land.” Suspicions of complicity immediately
fell on his erstwhile accomplice, Louet, who lived so close next door that “it seemed
impossible that” he or “several of his servants could not have seen his movements by
the light of the moon23.” It was not until 3 May that Bunel was found hiding in the
house of a Company gunner, where he was promptly rearrested and taken to the fort of
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Mahé24. He would eventually be recalled to France. Louet would return to Europe to
plead his case as well.  Better connected employees like George Duval de Leyrit,  the
future governor of Pondichéry,  were quickly forgiven of any crimes and allowed to
return to Mahé25.  As was frequently the case in Company courts,  sentencing varied
according to the degree of influence that an employee commanded.
15 While the Company proved selective in its punishment of the individuals involved, its
reaction to the Mahé affair itself was unwaveringly severe. The directors in Paris used
the incident as an excuse to launch into a general denunciation of private commerce. In
their  correspondence  with  Pondichéry,  they  called  officials  on  the  conseil  superieur
“equally reprehensible [as the employees in Mahé] for knowing of similar incidences
and not reporting them to the Company26.” Having long protested against violations of
Company trading policies by employees overseas, the Paris directors were quick to use
the scandal as a pretext for denouncing the corruption, abuse, and “low regard for the
interests  of  the  Company”  that  seemed to  characterize  French commercial  activity
throughout India27. 
16 If  this  stern rebuke had been the end of  the affair,  the 1739 scandal  would merely
represent  one  sensationalized  example  in  a  long  line  of  disagreements  over  the
unsanctioned  trading  ambitions  of  Company  employees.  The  pepper  crisis,  though,
continued  to  inspire  contentious  debate  for  several  decades.  While  the  directors
seethed and the councilors in Pondichéry demurred, Company employees took it upon
themselves  to  judge  the  implications  of  Mahé  scandal.  Jacques  d’Eprémesnil  –  the
onetime head of the Company’s council in Madras after the French conquest of the city
– offered perhaps the most vocal reaction to the affair in his 1755, Sur le Crédit de la
Nation dans l’Inde,  where he lamented the long-term consequences of the Company’s
reaction to the incident. The Company’s directors, he argued, failed to calibrate their
trading policies according to the diverse political and economic circumstances within
each of the comptoirs28. 
17 The incident in Mahé turned from an extreme and public case of abuse by colonial
officials  to  a  more  general indictment  of  arbitrary  regulation  and  the  Company’s
limited  commercial  vision.  According  to  d’Eprémesnil,  the  directors’  response
introduced the disastrous notion “that the Company would look with disfavor on all
employees who enriched themselves by legitimate means29.” In Pondichéry, members
of the council used the circumstances surrounding the affair as evidence that the Paris
directors  knew little  about  the  actual  practice  of  trade.  While  continuing to  blame
employees in Mahé for neglecting their duties in the pursuit  of  “private interests”,
officials  in  Pondichéry  blasted  the  Company  for  imposing  heavy  duties  on  goods
entering the Malabar Coast, which prevented ships from Basra, China, and Macao from
selling  their  wares  in  the  French port30.  According to  the  council,  unjust  Company
prohibitions had pushed the employees in Mahé down a destructive path by impeding
the commercial development of the comptoir31. 
18 D’Eprémesnil  elaborated  on  this  claim  in  his  1755  treatise.  Like  the  Pondichéry
councilors,  he  argued  that  the  Mahé  scandal  was  symptomatic  of  a  more  general
problem: the failure of  Company directors  to  understand market  conditions on the
subcontinent.  Administrators  in  Paris  grumbled  about  the  Company’s  lack  of
profitability while at the same time condemning men like Louet, who in his “long stay
at Mahé had acquired a perfect knowledge of the language, customs and commerce of
the country32” – attributes necessary for commercial success. D’Eprémesnil argued that
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the development of a robust private trade was the most assured way of acquiring credit
among indigenous lenders in the French-occupied regions of the subcontinent33. He saw
in the  Mahé affair  a  perfect  example  of  how the  Company mismanaged its  affairs.
Company directors ignored the pleas of employees in India while allowing misplaced
suspicion, imperfect understandings of commercial science, and political circumstances
in France to dictate their trading policies.
19 To  be  sure,  d’Eprémesnil’s  account  overlooked  key  details  about  the  Mahé  affair,
including  the  seemingly  clear  complicity  of  Bunel,  Louet,  and  Saint-Martin  in
defrauding the Company. There were good reasons for such an omission. D’Eprémensil
had begun his career in India as a private trader, and his brother, Georges de Leyrit,
was heavily implicated in the pepper scandal. The entire focus of d’Eprémesnil’s essay
was on the failure of the Company’s efforts to support credit-acquiring ventures in
India, and his emphasis on the economic fallout from the pepper crisis strengthened
his  overarching  claims.  Nonetheless,  d’Eprémesnil’s  interpretation  of  this  incident
highlights a problem that had become obvious to employees early in the Company’s
trading  operations  in  India.  The  issue  of  “country”  trade  represented  a  significant
stumbling block in relations between those undertaking commerce in India and those
regulating  it  in  France.  What  on  the  one  side  constituted  innovative  commercial
practices seemed to the other like self-interested abuse. These divergent perspectives
reflected a fundamental disagreement within the Company over the compatibility of
profit seeking and private enterprise with the obligations of public service.
20 In the contentious correspondence between the Company and its colonial councils, in
ship manifests that disguised the illicit commercial activities of Company employees,
and in rancorous mémoires that inveighed against Company policy, an ongoing contest
over  private  trade  played  itself  out.  Throughout  the  1720s  and  1730s,  the  Paris
directors  constantly  adjusted  their  stance  on  this  issue;  “nothing,”  argued  Alfred
Martineau,  “was  more  capricious”  than  the  Company’s  approach  to  “country”
commerce34. This dispute touched on commercial activities in all of the comptoirs; but
tensions were most pronounced over the pepper trade centered in Mahé.  No other
commodity created such a pronounced strain between the Company’s trading agenda
and  the  commercial  interests  of  private  traders.  The style  of  textile  demanded  by
wholesalers in Europe differed from those that were popular in the markets of India; in
the case of this trade, there was little overlap between the goods sold by the Company
and those distributed by independent merchants. Pepper, though, fetched a high price
both in France and in ports across Asia35. 
21 The very factors that limited Mahé’s development caused the comptoir to loom large in
the ongoing contest over the Company’s monopolistic trading policies. Spurred by their
financial  distress,  isolation,  and  strategic  vulnerability,  the  councilors  of  Mahé
intermingled with the private  trading societies  that  had sprung up throughout  the
settlement,  precariously  balancing  their  duties  to  the  Company  with  their
commitments  to  these  competing  commercial  interests.  As  d’Eprémesnil’s  treatise
attests,  the  controversies  generated by this  muddled situation continued to  inspire
vocal debate years after the 1739 scandal shattered this arrangement. Unfolding along
lines  of  patronage  and  across  family  networks,  these  conflicts  confounded  simple
distinctions  between  metropole  and  colony,  or  licit  and  illicit  commerce.  They
represented an attempt by Mahé’s governing council and chief employees to situate,
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and ultimately to resolve, problems immediate to their settlement within the broader
political economy of the Company.
 
Expansion and Diplomacy 
22 Beginning in the 1740s,  the Company found itself  embroiled in an almost unending
series of violent conflicts. With the War of the Austrian Succession raging in Europe,
the British and French along the Coromandel Coast. When peace was secured in the
1748  Treaty  of  Aix-la-Chapelle,  colonial  administrators  from  both  nations  replaced
open  fighting  with  backroom  dealing  –  supporting  rival  claimants  to  several  local
kingdoms  in  the  hopes  of  increasing  their  influence  and  creating  new  sources  of
revenue. These indirect methods of expansion, often pursued without the knowledge of
superiors in Europe, led once again to open conflict in the early 1750s. Despite some
initial success, the French Company soon experienced a series of reverses. In 1754, the
architect of these controversial proxy wars, Joseph Dupleix, was recalled to Paris to
answer  for  his  actions36.While  peace  was  briefly  achieved  from  1754  to  1755,  the
outbreak of the Seven Years’ War resulted in the eruption of a new set of conflicts on
the subcontinent – all with disastrous results for the French. By the end of the fighting
in 1763, the Company had lost all its chief comptoirs, as well as many of its subordinate
factories. 
23 Before  this  conflict-ridden  period,  Company  employees  chafed  under  restrictive
trading  regulations.  As  violence  unfolded  across  India,  however,  problems  of  geo-
politics  and  military  strategy  emerged  as  a  new  source  of  contention.  In  their
correspondence with Paris, in rancorous colonial assembly meetings throughout the
comptoirs, and in negotiations with their local allies, employees openly questioned the
Company’s purpose in India. They debated whether a corporation chartered to oversee
foreign trade could also govern large swathes of foreign territory, and wondered about
the  rights  of  colonial  officials  to  expand  Company  holdings  without  consulting
authorities in France. Given greater publicity by the efforts of Dupleix, who appealed to
the  public  in  a  series  of  tendentious  mémoires after  returning  to  France 37,  these
questions inspired a broader criticism of Company activities as years of unremitting
conflict crippled French interests in India.
24 Such critiques acquired a new intensity as the Company collapsed under the pressure
of  debt  and  public  censure  after  the  Seven  Years’  War.  During  the  late  1760s,  the
Company’s impending dissolution sparked a vicious series of conflicts over free trade,
the economic health of the nation, and the moral implications of overseas commerce.
Satirical  poems  “eulogized”  the  death  of  the  Company  in  Paris,  while  Company
investors  squared  off  against  crown  ministers  and  the  economic  theorists  of  the
Gournay Circle, a prominent set of free trade advocates38. Often forgotten in the din of
these  disputes  over  commercial  policy  and  economic  interest  were  the  pressing
strategic  concerns  created  by  France’s  defeat  in  the  Seven  Years’  War.  When  the
Company fell in 1769, the crown assumed direct control of the comptoirs. Following this
development, activity in India would be judged according to how well it  served the
monarchy’s foreign policy rather than by the profits it generated.
25 Initially, Mahé contributed little to this growing anxiety over diplomacy and strategy.
The  comptoir engaged  in  a  brief  conflict  against  the  Bayanour of  Bargaret  from
1740-1741, but this war had few of the controversial implications of the violent fighting
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that raged through Bengal and eastern India from the 1740s to the early 1760s. Despite
the comptoir’s best efforts to maintain a peaceful settlement along the Malabar Coast,
however, broader developments in the Seven Years’  War conspired to frustrate this
plan. After a decisive French defeat at the 1757 Battle of Wandiwash, the British began
systematically subjugating France’s settlements in India. By 1761, Britain had captured
Chandernagor  in  Bengal,  the  Company’s  most  profitable  comptoir,  and  seized
Pondichéry  after  a  siege  lasting  several  months.  Mahé  succumbed  soon  after,
surrendering on 8 February 1761.
26 Although Mahé had remained fairly removed from the divisive disputes of the previous
twenty years, questions about how the town fit within the broader patterns of French
strategy in India after the Seven Years’ War quickly became a source of contention.
Negotiations  with the British for  the return of  the comptoir went  through frequent
delays,  stalling over questions of restitution and the borders of the settlement. The
British destroyed a number of houses, fortifications, and warehouses in Mahé, while
the Kattanad ruler, to whom they then ceded the comptoir, plundered what remained of
the settlement.  Louis Plusquellec,  a French army captain assigned to treat with the
British,  insisted  on  three  lakhs  (300,000  rupees)  in  compensation  for  these
depredations, but his demands fell on deaf ears39. In their correspondence with their
superiors in Pondichéry, the Mahé councilors complained constantly about the “bad
faith”  of  the  British,  who  seemed  to  care  little  about  the  terms  of  the  French
capitulation40.  They worried as  well  about the French relationship with the various
feudatories  surrounding Mahé,  complaining that  the princes  in  the region “treated
them  arrogantly”  and  expressing  skepticism  about  the  continued  viability  of  the
French settlement41. 
27 On 20 October 1765, the French finally agreed to a settlement that reduced Mahé to its
1749 borders. The comptoir’s future, though, still remained in doubt. Picot de la Motte,
Mahé’s governor, wrote of his “embarrassment” at assuming the command of a town
“without  money”  and  “without  any  resources42.”  In  a  1767  mémoire discussing
conditions within the European settlements across India, Jean Law de Lauriston – the
new governor of Pondichéry – contrasted the “immense sums” required for the upkeep
of the comptoirs with the “little trade” undertaken there. He suggested that the French
resettle to either Collèche, on the southern tip of the subcontinent, or Karwar, located
near the Portuguese colony of Goa43.  Even after the British restored the comptoir to
France, Mahé’s place among the other French settlements in India remained unclear. 
28 Part  of  this  confusion  stemmed  from  the  uncertain  vision  of  crown  policymakers
regarding  French  interests  on  the  subcontinent.  Historians  remain  divided  over
France’s intentions in the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War. Whereas some scholars
contend  that  the  French  abandoned  their  grander  designs  in  India  after  1763  –
contenting  themselves  instead  with  the  maintenance  of  a  few  small  commercial
settlements – others argue that France’s colonial  administrators were committed to
expanding as soon as it was practicable44. Whatever the case, French designs often seem
to  have  been  highly  improvised.  Instead  of  following  a  consistent  trajectory,  plans
shifted  to  fit  within  an  ever-changing  geo-political  climate  and  to  conform  to  the
personal  projects  of  various  crown officials.  India  loomed large  in  the  revanche,  or
vengeance-oriented,  schemes  of  foreign  ministers  like  the  Duc  de Choiseul  and  the
Comte de Vergennes, who sought to limit the growth of the British territorial holdings
overseas. But French policymakers were reluctant to engage in a concerted program of
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imperial  expansion  on  the  subcontinent.  Instead,  France  adopted  an  opportunistic
approach to  developments  in  India;  unwilling to  invest  the manpower and funding
needed to mount a serious challenge to Britain’s interests in India, they exploited local
alliances in the hopes of halting British expansion45.
29 Mahé played a prominent role in this indirect strategy. The settlement lay near the
Kingdom  of  Mysore,  a  powerful  state  whose  leader,  Haidar  Ali,  opposed  British
expansion in the southern regions of the subcontinent. Haidar Ali had deep ties with
France. During the succession crises in Hyderabad and Arcot, he had served alongside
the Company as commander of Mysore’s cavalry. By 1760, Haidar Ali had deposed the
reigning Hindu ruler of Mysore, converted the kingdom to Islam, and introduced a set
of modernizing reforms. He established a new capital at Seringapatam, where he built
an imposing citadel, and hired European engineers, soldiers, and advisors to create a
potent  field  army.  Eager  to  benefit  from these improvements,  French policymakers
courted Haidar Ali aggressively in the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War. The Duc de
Choiseul dispatched a delegation to his court in 1769, and Law de Lauriston maintained
regular contact with the reform-minded king46. But it was with the councilors at Mahé
that Haidar Ali had the most regular contact.
30 Administrators in the comptoir corresponded with the king on behalf of their superiors
in Pondichéry, but they also used their relationship with Haidar Ali to try and improve
Mahé’s situation on the Malabar Coast. When the ruler of Kattanad squeezed onerous
concessions from the French in exchange for the return of the town in 1765, Mahé’s
councilors considered appealing to Mysore to intervene on their behalf47. A year later,
Picot  wrote  to  Law  de  Lauriston  about  his  hopes  that  Haidar  Ali,  who  had  been
campaigning  in  the  territory  around  Mahé,  would  restore  the  settlement  to  its
post-1749  borders48.  In  Versailles,  the  architects  of  French  foreign  policy  hoped  to
exploit an alliance with Mysore to challenge British expansion throughout in India. The
councilors  of  Mahé,  however,  approached  this  potential  diplomatic  relationship  by
considering its more immediate implications for the comptoir. 
31 Despite these hopeful entreaties, Haidar Ali made for an uncertain ally. At the same
time as Mahé’s leaders attempted to exploit the king’s expansionist policies to increase
the revenues, borders, and regional status of the comptoir, they remained unclear about
his  intentions.  In  an  anxious  January  1766  memorandum,  the  settlement’s  council
reported  to  Pondichéry  about  the  appearance  of  a  Mysore  fleet  along  the  Malabar
Coast, noting with concern that “they still did not know what footing they were on”
with Haidar Ali49. A few months later, the councilors reported that the king, who had by
this point conquered many of the territories adjacent to Mahé, was interfering with the
comptoir’s pepper shipments50. Even as he opposed British interests in India, Haidar Ali
entertained  envoys  from  Tellicherry,  who  lavished  the  king  with  gifts  that  the
delegates from Mahé could not afford to match. A partnership between Britain and
Mysore never materialized, but the possibility of reduced tensions or even an actual
alliance  between  the  two  rivals  seemed  real  enough  in  the  1760s51.  Thus  while
authorities  in  Pondichéry  and  Paris  attempted  to  cultivate  Haidar  Ali,  Mahé
experienced firsthand both the threats and tantalizing possibilities of diplomatic ties
with Mysore. The comptoir’s authorities attempted to use this relationship to restore
the settlement to regional significance, but found themselves just as likely to suffer
from the expansionist policies of Haidar Ali as to benefit from them. 
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32 During his term as governor of Mahé from 1765 to 1773, Picot de la Motte negotiated
cautiously with Mysore.  His successor,  however,  acted with far less restraint.  When
Picot de la Motte took a leave of absence in November 1773, he was replaced by Pierre-
Antoine  Duprat,  whose  travel  journal  began  this  article,  came  to  India  filled  with
notions of adventure. Convinced of the timidity of the indigenous population in India,
and of British vulnerability there, he sought to increase Mahé’s territory by intervening
in regional conflicts along the Malabar Coast52. As governor, Duprat saw it as his duty to
improve conditions in Mahé through aggressive expansion. 
33 Duprat’s tenure coincided with a transitional moment for the municipal governments
of the French comptoirs. After the dissolution of the Company, the crown opened India
up to private trade. Yet France also maintained numerous facets of Company policy,
restricting merchants to the corporation’s  former ports  and retaining its  system of
conseils provinciaux. In short, this moment of broad imperial restructuring, where the
crown assumed direct  control  of  colonial  spaces  once overseen by an intermediary
corporate body, was also marked by continuities in administrative personnel and the
exercise of municipal power. The crown would overhaul the councils in 1776, assuming
the responsibility for appointing new councilors, and reducing the autonomy of the
court systems in the Indian settlements by forcing them to adhere to metropolitan
French law rather than their own judicial precedents. But before, and even beyond this
point, the councils retained many of their former privileges53.
34 Duprat’s efforts reflect this broader context; he was at once a royal official with a clear
set  of  directives  from  his  superiors,  and  a  colonial  official  with  local  political
obligations and considerable latitude in the handling of municipal affairs. Mahé’s most
pressing  issue  in  the  early  stages  of  Duprat’s  tenure  was  a  financial;  by  1773,  the
comptoir could not even meet basic operating costs54. Duprat’s overriding goal was thus
to restore economic stability to the settlement. To do so, he proposed an expansionist
campaign redolent of the aggressive policies of Dupleix. Whereas Duprat’s project had
all the controversial implications of this earlier scheme, though, it contained little of its
careful consideration of geo-political conditions on the subcontinent. Consider Duprat’s
description of this plan in his later memoirs: “I was convinced that good faith would do
more than gold…going from that principle, I came upon the notion to create an empire
for France55.” Confident that ambition and French élan would carry the day even in the
face  of  a  crippling  lack  of  manpower,  funding,  and  materiel,  Duprat  searched  for
convenient opportunity to extend Mahé’s influence.
35 The  colonel  soon  found  such  an  occasion  in  a  local  conflict  between  the  nearby
kingdom of  Calicut  –  where  the  French  maintained  their  small trading  post  –  and
Mysore.  Calicut  had  been a  tributary  of  Haidar  Ali’s  since  his  expansion  along  the
Malabar Coast during the late 1760s. Sensing that Mysore was overextended, however,
the  Zamorin  of  Calicut,  the  territory’s  ruler,  reinstalled  himself  and  declared  his
kingdom independent in 1773. He then petitioned the French for aid. Duprat recast
Mahé’s relationship with Haidar Ali to justify his intervention in Calicut. In a mémoire
written to explain the campaign, he wrote: “this conqueror, they say, is our friend: but I
know instead that  it  is  us  who have made him so56.”  Duprat  listed the concessions
France  had  made  to  the  king  of  Mysore,  noting  that  even  though  France  had
accommodated  all  of  Haidar  Ali’s  demands,  it  still  did  not  enjoy  a  meaningful
partnership with him. According to Duprat, Haidar Ali was a false friend, someone who
proclaimed  his  desire  for  an  alliance,  but  then  “who  acted  like  an  enemy”  by
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subjugating the territories of France’s allies57. Ostensibly acting on behalf of Calicut, the
colonel planned to turn Mahé into a center of regional power. He entered into terms
with the Zamorin without consulting his superiors in either Pondichéry or Paris.
36 The results of this ill-considered venture were predictably disastrous. After concluding
a treaty with the Zamorin, Duprat set sail for Calicut with a force of 150 soldiers and
three  cannons58.  He  arrived to  find a  Mysore  fleet  blocking Calicut’s  harbor.  While
Duprat obsessed over fanfare – delaying the disembarkation of his troops so that they
could “descend with all possible glory” in the light of day – Haidar Ali dispatched his
trusted general, Srinivasa Rao, with tens of thousands of troops to retake Calicut59. The
soldiers from Mahé soon found themselves surrounded, forcing Duprat to reconcile his
deeply held beliefs  about the superiority of  French spirit  with the fact that he was
vastly outnumbered. The Zamorin soon fled Calicut, and Srinvasa Rao permitted Duprat
to abandon his position. Humiliated but alive, Duprat returned to Mahé at the end of
January 1774. His campaign had lasted a little longer than two weeks.
37 The colonel’s actions immediately following this incident further undermined French
relations with Mysore. Still stinging from his defeat, Duprat declared in March 1774
that  he  would  enforce  France’s  exclusive  right  to  the  pepper  trade  in  the  area
immediately  surrounding  Mahé.  The  comptoir had  enjoyed  this  monopoly  since  the
1720s, but the settlement’s council rarely exercised its trading privilege. With too little
money to purchase all of the pepper set aside for them by the ruler of Kadattanad, the
French traditionally allowed this  prince to sell  off  surplus amounts of  the spice.  In
quick succession, Duprat cancelled this arrangement – a ruinous turn for Kadattanad
since Mahé still could not buy up all the region’s pepper – and commanded Haidar Ali
to make all his future purchases of the commodity from the French60. These maneuvers
once  again  brought  France  to  the  brink  of  war  with  Mysore.  Only  the  direct
intervention of Law de Lauriston, who dismissed Duprat, countermanded his demands
to Haidar Ali, and reappointed Picot de la Motte, prevented the breakout of hostilities. 
38 Short-lived as  it  was,  Duprat’s  expedition had serious long-term consequences.  The
colonel’s rash actions poisoned French relations with Haidar Ali. During the course of
the campaign, Duprat had drafted a string of imperious letters to the king, threatening
Mysore and admonishing Haidar Ali to avoid interfering with French interests. Even in
defeat, he continued to antagonize the king; after his capitulation in Calicut, Duprat
wrote haughtily to Haidar Ali that he had withdrawn on his own initiative, not out of
fear of Mysore61. Certainly the colonel’s dismissal helped reduce tensions, as did the
return of  Picot  and his  more diplomatic  style  of  governance in 1775.  But  relations
remained strained in the period immediately following Duprat’s administration. Haidar
Ali would remain distrustful of the French in general – cooling not only toward the
councilors at Mahé, but also Law de Lauriston. Rumors of Mysore’s disaffection inspired
new intrigue among the British, who encouraged a local ruler, the Prince of Chirakkal,
to expand at Mahé’s expense. The French halted this aggressive maneuvering through
several skirmishes fought along Mahé’s borders62. But several years would pass before
Haidar Ali seriously considered French entreaties again.
39 Historians often forget Mahé’s impact on French military and diplomatic developments
on the subcontinent,  fixating on events  along the Coromandel  Coast  and in  Bengal
while overlooking significant developments within the comptoir63. Yet Mahé’s efforts
during  this  period  of  contentious  campaigning  and  hesitant  policymaking  offer  an
instructive  reminder  of  the  divisive  impulses  operating  across  France’s  Indian
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settlements.  As  administrators  in  Pondichéry  and  Paris  hope  to  advance  French
fortunes through opportunistic alliances and proxy campaigning, councilors in Mahé
exploited this strategy in an attempt to transform the comptoir into a regional power.
French  officials  on  the  Malabar  Coast  petitioned  Mysore  to  redress  a  string  of
grievances, from the unequal distribution of the pepper trade to the aggressive policies
of the British at Tellicherry. As in the case of Duprat and his costly adventure, these
efforts could diverge sharply from the general French strategy pursued in India. Even
as  France’s  grip  on  India  continued  to  loosen,  the  ambitions  of  Mahé’s  councilors
proved resilient, and their pursuit of local interests aggressive. 
40 Larger developments, however, would conspire to frustrate these aims. In 1778, France
declared  war  on  the  British  as  part  of  their  effort  to  the  support the  American
Revolution. Although this aggressive posturing contributed to Britain’s defeat in North
America,  it  left  the  French  comptoirs in  India  once  more  vulnerable  to  attack.
Pondichéry fell in October of that year. Picot de la Motte appealed to Haidar Ali for help
defending Mahé – delaying a British assault  through his entreaties.  Once it  became
apparent that Mysore would not intercede directly on the comptoir’s behalf, however,
British  soldiers  finally  moved  against  Mahé,  which  by  early  1779  was  the  only
remaining French settlement in India.  Isolated,  undermanned,  and without hope of
outside  assistance,  Mahé  surrendered  in  March.  Positioned  precariously  between
Tellicherry and Mysore, the settlement would remain a contested site for the duration
of the war. Although he had refused to intercede on Mahé’s behalf,  Haidar Ali soon
found himself at war with Britain, and the comptoir would trade hands several times
during  the  conflict.  British  troops  once  more  pillaged  the  settlement;  by  the  time
hostilities between Britain and France ceased in 1783, the town was in ruins. 
 
Restoration and Revolution
41 On  1  March  1789,  commissioners  for  the  Compagnie  des  Indes,  which  had  been
reconstituted in 1785, wrote enthusiastically to administrators in Pondichéry about a
series of radical developments in France. The kingdom was beset by a financial crisis,
teetering on the brink of “a general bankruptcy64.” But while this situation should have
been a cause for alarm, it had instead become a source of celebration. In the throes of
fiscal desperation, Louis XVI had restored Jacques Necker – the Genevan banker who
served  as  Controller-General  from  1776-1781  –  to  his  former  position.  The
reappointment  of  the  celebrated  minister,  who  had  garnered  popular  acclaim  by
pushing  for  greater  transparency  in  the  management  of  royal  finances,  generated
excitement across France. The report noted the “joy spreading in the hearts” of the
people, the “euphoria” in Paris and the “enthusiasm” that seemed to “burst” across the
provinces65. The commissioners themselves admitted that they could barely “restrain
their  rapture66.”  Necker  had  always  supported  Company  activities;  as  a  former
shareholder, he had vocally defended the corporation during its dissolution in 176967.
Rather than generate a sense of foreboding, the economic catastrophes preceding the
Revolution created a sense of new opportunity for France’s long-neglected comptoirs in
India. 
42 Indeed, such a change was welcome in Mahé, where there had been little cause for
optimism  in  the  years  between  the  American  and  French  Revolutions.  During  this
period, the French balanced increasingly unrealistic hopes of expansion with the threat
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of complete collapse. A fleet under the command of Admiral de Suffren challenged the
British in the Indian Ocean, while the French agent Montigny labored for several years
to establish a partnership between France and the Maratha Confederacy, a powerful
collection of Hindu princes that controlled much of central India68. Yet the war also
ravaged  the  French  settlements,  which  were  restored  to  France  as  part  of  the
conditions of the 1783 Treaty of Paris, and ultimately did little to challenge Britain’s
interests on the subcontinent. When the French reassumed control of Mahé in 1785,
few  buildings  remained  undamaged.  Once  more,  France’s  oversized  ambitions
confronted the material limitations and strategic vulnerability facing its comptoirs.
43 The reconstitution of  the Compagnie  des  Indes by Charles  Alexandre de Calonne,  the
finance  minister  who  served  immediately  after  Necker’s  first  term  as  Controller-
General, offered institutional change with limited relief. The new Company floated a
twenty thousand rupee loan to the settlement, which permitted the reconstruction of
administrative offices, a magazine, a jail, and a church69. Eager to avoid provoking the
British into future conflicts along the Coromandel Coast, policymakers in France even
considered  turning  the  comptoir into  the  chief  French  settlement  in  India.  The
geographical challenges that had constrained the town’s growth, however, dissuaded
the French against pursuing this plan70.  Even with many of its important structures
rebuilt,  Mahé  remained  vulnerable  to  attack  by  local  bandits;  the  garrison  was
undermanned,  the  border  unfortified,  and  the  harbor  rarely  visited  by  French
warships. Unable to attract many investors, the Company lacked the additional funds
needed to develop Mahé’s military infrastructure71. De Canaple, the town’s governor,
captured the desperation of this situation in a September 1789 letter to his superior in
Pondichéry: “For two years, I have witnessed the agony of this comptoir: spare me, I beg
of you, from the sad spectacle of its death72.” 
44 The  transition  between  new  Company  government  and  the  early  stages  of  the
Revolution reveal a growing emphasis on centralization and standardization in all the
Indian comptoirs. In 1784, a royal edict eliminated the former municipal administration
system and replaced it with a more streamlined conseil, reinforcing crown control by
placing  the  comptoir under  the  control  of  a  royal  commissioner,  and  apportioning
offices based on seniority (all merchants over 25 were invited to serve on the council).
The establishment of Calonne’s company the following year further limited municipal
autonomy; the corporation’s charter defined it as an explicitly commercial enterprise,
with  no  additional  governmental  privileges  or  obligations73.  Revolutionary
developments in France seemed to complement this emphasis on centralization. Fiscal
reform,  personnel  shifts,  and  a  more  rationalized  colonial  policy  followed  the
bloodshed, social breakdown, and political restructuring that characterized the early
years of the Revolution74. Across France’s empire, notions of liberty, citizenship, and
representation framed a shared political vocabulary and culture. 
45 Recent  scholarship,  however,  has  revealed  important  limits  to  the  universalist
aspirations of the Revolution within the French empire. While the National Assembly
espoused  a  language  of  undifferentiated  popular  sovereignty,  France’s  colonies
remained subject to exclusive trading practices that favored metropolitan merchants75.
The  institution of  slavery  presented  a  nearly  intractable  paradox for  revolutionary
idealists,  for  chattel  slaves  were  at  once  a  type  of  possession  protected  by  the
Revolution’s growing emphasis on individual property and a bonded people denied the
liberty  that  was  so  central  to  its  political  culture76.  And as  in  the  metropole  itself,
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revolutionary upheaval created new occasions for violence and social disorder. Mahé’s
experience reinforces this image of a Revolution based on difference, divided interests,
and confused conceptions of authority.
46 In  December  1790,  the  citizens  of  Mahé  created  a  colonial  assembly,  replacing  the
settlement’s administrative council with a new assembly composed of all Frenchmen in
the colony,  and establishing a national guard.  The town’s new governor,  Le Tellier,
struggled to manage these revolutionary developments. He described Mahé as a “ship”,
beset on all sides by a storm, “and called himself” a novice hand” managing “the helm
at a time when an experienced man was needed77.” In a series of missteps, Le Tellier
delayed alerting Pondichéry about the creation of  the colonial assembly until  April
179178. He also made a string of concessions to the legislature’s new president, M. de
Boyer. While Le Tellier maintained nominal authority, the colonial assembly assumed
control over political, commercial, and military affairs in the comptoir. 
47 From  the  beginning,  Boyer  devoted  himself  to  addressing  the  comptoir’s  crumbling
infrastructure and insufficient funding. A former purchasing agent for the Company,
he exploited his wealth to consolidate power. As Le Tellier noted, Boyer distributed
large sums of money throughout the impoverished comptoir79. The president adopted
the manners of  a  revolutionary,  strolling through Mahé in a “national  costume” to
which he appended ceremonial “epaulets,” and employing the language of fraternal
citizenship.  But  he  devoted  most  of  his  attention  –  and  nearly  5000  rupees  –  to
reforming  the  administration  of  the  hapless  comptoir80. Through  both  political
maneuvering and direct investment, Boyer facilitated the construction of a new town
hall and the distribution of subsidized rice. Under him, Mahé’s revolutionary energies
manifested  themselves  in  a  series  of  material  improvements.  While  he  spoke  and
dressed  like  a  patriot,  Boyer  seemed  to  show  little  concern  for  the  course  of  the
Revolution in either France or the other comptoirs. 
48 The initial enthusiasm over these improvements quickly gave way to dissension and
factionalism.  In  April  1791,  the  Company dispatched an agent  from Pondichéry,  de
Gondreville, who tempered some of Boyer’s most radical reforms. At de Gondreville’s
suggestion, Boyer gave up his presidential office – adopting the title of mayor in the
spirit of greater equality – and restored Mahé’s council to power81. But just as town
revolutionaries  approached  a  point  of  stability,  personal  conflicts  between  several
notable  citizens  threatened  to  tear  the  new  political  settlement  apart.  In  May,  M.
Menesse, the leader of Mahe’s national guard, accused a follow conciliar, M. Dubreuilh,
of slandering his name. In retribution for this supposed calumny, Menesse invoked his
authority and attempted to remove Dubreuilh from the town council. As the string of
accusations, recriminations, and reprisals spiraled out of control, Boyer convoked an
emergency meeting of Mahé’s council. Ever one for symbolic gestures, he came before
this assembly carrying a small, ornamental case, from which he produced a red flag – a
dramatic production,  he explained,  meant to signify the start of  martial  law. Boyer
then arrested Menesse, condemning him for his demagoguery and tyrannical impulses.
Instead of restoring calm, Boyer’s handling of the affair created new divisions among
the citizenry. By July, Le Tellier noted in alarm to the governor of Pondichéry that the
town had descended into chaos82. 
49 If the Revolution provided Mahé’s notables with an opportunity to improve conditions
within  the  town,  it  also  masked  the  pursuit  of  private  agendas  behind  legitimate
pretense – thus reinforcing the ambiguity that had marked the relationship of private
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interest to public policy throughout Mahé’s history. Langlade, a town merchant who
defended  Menesse  against  Boyer’s  oppressive  policies,  captured  this  tension  in  an
address  delivered  before  the  town’s  council.  “Assemblies  are  made  for  the  general
good,” he admonished the councilors, “not for personal affairs83.” Judged an accomplice
of Menesse’s, Langlade was soon jailed as well. He escaped at the end of July and fled
toward Travancore, a kingdom to the south of Mahé. Le Tellier did little to restrain the
turmoil; the trial of Menesse would continue for months until he was eventually sent to
Pondichéry for judgment by the conseil superieur. The town remained in an uproar until
the arrival of Le Tellier’s replacement – Larcher – in October 1791. 
50 Larcher helped restore some stability to the comptoir.  Despite his calming influence,
however, the factionalism that had divided the town during the early phases of the
Revolution soon created further tension. In May 1792, Pondichéry’s colonial assembly
found Menesse not guilty of  the charges leveled against him. As compensation,  the
assembly  ordered  Boyer  to  pay  him  an  indemnity  of  6,300  rupees84.  This  acquittal
signaled a dramatic shift in political power within Mahé. Menesse soon returned to the
comptoir, and with a mandate for municipal reform from Pondichéry, demanded that
the Mahé council hold new elections through a general assembly composed of all the
town’s citizens. This call for legislative change spurred the rise of competing electoral
factions – one under Boyer, and the other under Menesse and Langlade, who had also
returned to the settlement. On 24 June, the general assembly elected a new central
committee  consisting  of  nine  legislators.  As  recipients  of  the  highest  and  second
highest tally of votes, Menesse and Langlade became the de facto leaders of this new
legislature.  Boyer  and  his  supporters,  by  contrast,  were  completely  ousted  from
power85.
51 From political prisoners to municipal leaders in little less than a year, Menesse and
Langlade  set  about  consolidating  their  authority.  They  soon  ran  afoul  of  Larcher,
however, who sought to limit their disruptive influence. Larcher refused to recognize
the legislative changes enacted in late June, and demanded a new meeting of the town’s
general  assembly  in  early  July.  At  this  gathering,  he  questioned  the  course  of
revolutionary developments in Mahé, denouncing the erroneous thinking and “reckless
desire  for  absolute  independence”  that  seemed  to  drive  the  town’s  citizenry86.  In
eloquent fashion,  Larcher challenged the course of  Mahé’s  entire  revolution,  which
opposed  local  interests  and antagonisms  to  the  lofty  aspirations  for  representative
government,  human rights,  and universal  brotherhood that  supposedly  infused  the
revolutionary movement in France. Larcher succeeded in convincing the assembly to
reverse the summer’s recent developments. But his politicking aroused the anger of
town notables such as Menesse, Langlade, and even Boyer. As early as 9 July, Langlade
sent a letter to Pondichéry complaining about Larcher’s conduct87.
52 The governor in Pondichéry condemned Larcher for involving himself too intimately in
the private affairs of the settlement. This censure inspired new intrigue on the part of
Mahé’s  aggressive  committee  members,  who continued to  protest  against  Larcher’s
decisions  over  the  following months.  Not  until  October  1792,  when the Pondichéry
assembly decided to award Menesse and Langlade a settlement of 12,000 rupees, did
tensions  finally  begin  to  relax88.  In  a  year  of  infighting  and  intrigue,  Mahé’s
revolutionaries had done little to improve the town. As was the case in both France and
within the colonies, the reformist energies of the early Revolution had given way to
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aggressive partisan politics. Although Larcher finally achieved stability in the comptoir,
Mahé remained poor, underdeveloped, and vulnerable. 
53 Indeed,  regional  diplomatic  and  strategic  challenges  continued  to  haunt  the  town.
While  officials  in  Pondichéry  strove  to  create  a  national  assembly  composed  of
delegates from all the comptoirs, war between Britain and Tipu Sultan raged along the
Malabar  Coast.  The  son  of  Haidar  Ali,  and  an occasional  ally  of  the  French,  Tipu
continually violated Mahé’s borders during the conflict. The British, meanwhile, began
to  stop  and  search  French  shipping  under  the  pretense  of  halting  the  flow  of
contraband to Mysore89.  In the interim between the two crises involving Boyer and
Menesse,  Larcher  busied  himself  by  protesting  against  the  violations  of  French
neutrality. For the most part, however, his pleas went unanswered. Despite its initial
promise, Mahé’s revolution seemed to create more problems than solutions. Fearful of
the revolutionary movement, Britain declared war against France in 1793, blockading
the Atlantic coast and attacking French colonies in the Caribbean and Asia.  For the
third time in less than thirty years, British forces threatened Mahé. Realizing that the
comptoir was indefensible, the town’s general assembly decided to accept whatever the
terms  the  British  offered90.  On  16  July  1793,  Mahé  surrendered.  Britain  would  not
restore the settlement to France until after the Napoleonic Wars. 
54 Mahé’s  citizens  exploited  revolutionary  developments  to  assert  the  comptoir’s
autonomy, as well  as to advance certain factions within the municipal government.
This  trend  left  the  settlement  not  only  divided  internally,  but  also  susceptible  to
external intervention. This fraught series of developments is often forgotten amid the
turmoil caused by the Revolution’s arrival in India. Next to the violence and confusion
of  the  revolutionary  movements  in  Chandernagor  and  Ile  de  France,  the  town
experienced only a minor set of disruptions. More significant than the scale of Mahé’s
revolution, or the upheaval it generated, are the parallels between this event and the
earlier moments in the comptoir’s  history.  As was the case with the private trading
controversies of the 1730s, the town’s interactions with Haidar Ali in the 1760s, and the
expansionist  policies  of  Duprat  in  the  1770s,  broader  concerns  within  the  French




55 As  Mahé’s  history  reminds,  France’s  Indian  settlements  were  not  merely  reactive
places,  alternatively  obeying  or  defying  the  dictates  handed  down  a  distant
metropolitan authority. Instead, these were dynamic spaces navigating between major
shifts  in  French  imperial  policy  and  a  recurring  set  of  regional  concerns.  When
approached from the perspective of an individual comptoir, the transitional moments in
the history of  French empire betray startling continuities – not only in patterns of
municipal governance, but also in the way that major shifts in imperial policy were
interpreted and shaped by agents on the ground. 
56 Developments in Mahé challenge the traditional model of power in the imperial history
of the Old Regime. While crown ministers spoke of rigid hierarchy and undifferentiated
sovereignty, colonial authority was open to constant negotiation, and the ideologies
that infused France’s  imperial  enterprise were reimagined by a variety of  actors.  If
acknowledging this dynamic enriches our perspective on the French colonial project, it
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also qualifies our understanding of empire in the eighteenth century. For just as we
must examine how a settlement like Mahé responded to broader changes in imperial
ideology and policy, we must also ask how these developments were themselves shaped
by the interests, obligations, and challenges unique to specific colonial spaces.
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ABSTRACTS
This article explores Mahé’s interconnected experiences as both a semi-autonomous municipal
government  and  a  subordinate  territory  within  France’s  overseas  empire.  A  small,  often
neglected  outpost  on  the  southwestern  coast  of  India,  Mahé  carved  out  a  distinct  regional
identity  over  the  course  of  the  eighteenth  century.  Following  the  town’s  history  from  its
establishment in 1725 to its capture by the British in 1793, I examine the striking continuities
within its municipal political culture, even in the face of ongoing changes to French colonial
policy  in  Versailles.  This  article  highlights  the  role  of  supposedly  marginal  spaces  in  the
development of  imperial  ideology,  revealing how local  politics  infused and often repurposed
France’s colonial project in the eighteenth century.
Cet article explore les histoires interconnectées de Mahé en tant que ville semi-autonome du
gouvernement municipal et en tant que territoire subordonné de l’empire français d’outre-mer.
Mahé était une petite colonie sur la côte sud ouest de l’Inde. Elle développa une identité régionale
distincte au cours du XVIIIème  siècle. En examinant l’histoire de cette ville de sa fondation en
1725, jusqu’à sa prise par les Anglais en 1793, cet article illumine des continuités frappantes dans
sa  culture  politique,  alors  que  la  politique  coloniale  de  la  France  changeait  rapidement  à
Versailles. Cet article souligne l’influence des lieux marginaux dans la construction de l’idéologie
impériale, en révélant la manière dont la politique locale infusa et s’appropria le projet colonial
de la France au XVIIIème siècle.
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